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United States v. Rodriguez-Roman:
Prosecuting the Persecuted
I. Introduction
Throughout the Fidel Castro reign, the state of Cuba has
consistently deprived its citizens of rights and opportunities
routinely available in the United States and throughout the
Western Hemisphere.1 Under Castro, the Cuban government
consistently has denied its citizens freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, freedom of the press, and the freedom to associate-
suppressing their basic human liberties.2 Suffocating from an
embargo imposed by the United States, the poor economic state of
Cuba has further beleaguered its already depressed population.'
For the past three decades, Cubans have looked to America for
refuge and have been greeted with open arms during much of this
period.4 To those escaping Cuba, the United States has offered the
hope of freedon-but this freedom has not come without risk.
Those illegally leaving Cuba have risked severe punishment by the
Castro regime and by its criminal laws if returned.5
In August 1994, the hospitable policy of the United States
toward Cuban refugees began to change.6 On August 6, 1994,
Fidel Castro declared that the government would no longer
I See Thomas David Jones, A Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Haitian
Refugee Crises Revisited, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 479, 491.
2 See generally US. Policy in Support of Human Rights in Cuba, 1995: Before the
Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th Cong. 10-
23 (1995) (testimony of Michael Rannenberger) [hereinafter U.S. Cuban Rights Policy].
3 See Justin Burke, Cubans Simmer with Discontent as Economy and Capital
Crumble, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONIrOR, Aug. 12, 1994, at 1; Peter Grier, Raft Crisis Points
Out Need For Long-Term Cuba Policy, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Sept. 12, 1994, at 3.
4 See Deborah Ramirez, U.S. Tightens Cuban: Policy Would Detain Illegal
Arrivals, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 1996, at IA; Ann Devroy & Daniel Williams, In
Reversal, U.S. to Accept Cubans Held at Navy Base, WASH. POST, May 3, 1995, at Al.
5 See generally Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996).
6 See Ramirez, supra note 4, at IA.
7 See Jones, supra note 1, at 492; Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Will Return Refugees
to Cuba in Policy Switch, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1995, at Al, A14 (discussing chronology
of Cuban refugee crisis).
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interfere with Cubans departing for America.7 Subsequently, an
exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans on rafts and small boats tried
to cross the Florida Straits into South Florida, threatening an
immigration crisis.8 Instead of allowing the refugees to enter the
United States, the Clinton administration changed its receptive
policy toward Cuban immigrants, diverting the boat people to
refugee camps on U.S. military bases in Panama and Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.9 In the months following, President Clinton entered
into a bilateral agreement with Cuba that, among other things,
allowed the United States to intercept Cuban rafters and send them
back to Cuba."° The agreement also provided for the legal entrance
of at least 20,000 Cubans per year into the United States, in
addition to those granted "political asylum."" As part of this
resolution, the United States and Cuba agreed to "ensure that no
action [would be] taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as
a consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally.'
2
Unfortunately, illegally departed aliens still have reason to fear
reprisal and imprisonment from the Cuban government despite its
agreement to cease such punishment. 3 Indeed, Cuba's "illegal
exit" and "illegal entry" laws remain in effect, and assurances of
non-punishment by the government are not sufficient to ensure the
freedom of aliens upon their return to Cuba. 4 Obtaining political
asylum in the United States, therefore, remains critical for Cuban
citizens who illegally leave their native country. Furthermore, in
seeking political asylum in the United States, Cuban aliens today
can expect more procedural obstacles amidst a climate that is
8 See Ramirez, supra note 4, at 1 A; Devroy & Williams, supra note 4, at Al.
9 See Ramirez, supra note 4, at IA.
10 See id.; Joint Communiqu6 on Migration, Sept. 9, 1994, U.S.-Cuba, 5 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH, 1994, at 603; Joint Statement on Migration, U.S.-Cuba, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH,
May 2, 1995, at 397.
'1 See id.
12 Joint Statement on Migration, U.S.-Cuba, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 2, 1995, at
397.
13 See U.S. Cuban Rights Policy, supra note 2.
14 See id.
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clearly becoming less receptive to Cuban immigration. 5
Those who immigrate illegally to the United States may avoid
deportation by proving they would be subject to persecution for
their political views upon return to their former country.16 In
Rodriguez-Roman v. INS,7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of whether or not the
punishment an alien faces for illegal departure constitutes political
persecution or is simply punishment for committing crimes against
Cuba."8 The Ninth Circuit granted political asylum to the Cuban
man in Rodriguez-Roman, reversing the decision by the U.S.
immigration authorities.19 This Note explores the facts and the
holding of Rodriguez-Roman in Part 11.2" Part III examines the
background law,2' and Part IV provides an analysis of the court's
opinion and its potential effects on the future of Cuban
immigration law.22  Finally, this Note concludes that the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation in Rodriguez-Roman provides Cuban
citizens with a blueprint for obtaining asylum, although new
legislation may greatly curtail the federal judiciary's power to
review similar cases in the future. 23
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Francisco Lucas Rodriguez, born in Havana, was a citizen of
Cuba who throughout his lifetime held anti-Communist beliefs.24
While in Havana, he attended college and later became a teacher.
Discontented living within Cuba's Communist system, however,
15 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
16 See generally Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996).
17 Id.
18 See id. at 430-31.
19 See id. at 431.
20 See infra notes 24-83 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 84-181 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.23 See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
24 See Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 419 (9th Cir. 1996).
25 See id.
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he desired to escape from its "injustices."26 Rodriguez joined the
merchant marine as part of his plan to escape.27 As a crewmember
of the merchant marine, he initially served on vessels that worked
solely within Cuban waters." Eventually he was allowed to sail on
voyages into foreign waters.29  Taking advantage of this
opportunity, Rodriguez jumped ship and entered the United States
while on his third trip abroad. He applied for asylum on April
15, 1983.31
On January 6, 1986, Rodriguez was ordered to show cause
why he should not be deported because of his illegal entrance into
the United States.32 He conceded deportability, but requested
asylum and withholding of deportation.3 His request, made
pursuant to subsections 243(h) and 208(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 4 was based on his illegal departure from Cuba.35
Rodriguez stated that leaving Cuba without the government's
permission was a serious crime and viewed as an embarrassment
to the government.36
At an August 8, 1990 hearing on the merits of Rodriguez's
application, Rodriguez testified that he despised the Communist
system and had long planned to flee to the United States, with its
opportunity for freedom.37 He urged that he be granted asylum
because if deported back to Cuba he would be imprisoned or even
26 See id.
27 See id. Rodriguez stated that the merchant marine is not considered part of the
military. See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1253(h) (1994).
35 See Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 418.
36 See id. at 419. Rodriguez described his actions as particularly egregious under
the Cuban law in light of the fact that he received an education from the government and
that he was a crewmember of the merchant marine. See id. In his words, "he threw
these [benefits provided by the government] in their face when [he] left the country."
Id. 37 See id.
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executed because of his political beliefs." Rodriguez further
testified to the suffering imposed on his family for his actions.
One of his brothers was jailed for months because the Cuban
39government believed he had aided Rodriguez in his escape.
Other family members lost their jobs, were continually watched by
the government, and were considered outcasts within the
community.'
To further bolster his claim, Rodriguez presented two
witnesses who had been political prisoners in Cuba. The first
witness, Leon Franco, described the consequences of fleeing from
Cuba after being given the right to travel abroad.4 ' According to
Franco, such a person could expect "many years in prison for the
crime of looking for freedom and [sic] possibly be shot.' '42 He also
detailed the atrocious living conditions of inmates who were
charged with fleeing Cuba.43  According to the witness, the
government subjected these inmates to abuse amounting to a
"moral death," denied them visits and medical attention, and
forced them to share cells with violent and deranged inmates.
44
The second witness, Romero Menendez, echoed many of the
statements made by Franco.45
B. The Immigration Judge's Order
Despite the potential abuses and incarceration Rodriguez
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at419-20.
41 See id. at 420. Franco had been a prisoner in Cuba for nine years. See id. He
based his statements on observations and conversations with prisoners who had left
Cuba. See id.
42 Id. Franco testified that one who illegally departs from Cuba would be tried
before the Court of Crimes Against State Security and sentenced to between three and
twenty years in prison. See id.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id. Menendez, a prisoner for five years, did not see any inmates killed, but
he did notice that many had "disappeared." See id.
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faced, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application for
asylum.46  At the outset of the order, the IJ agreed with
Rodriguez's testimony that he detested the Communist system and
that he had left Cuba "due to his political beliefs." 47 He also did
not question that Rodriguez feared his arrest for leaving Cuba and
that there was a "clear probability of [him] being arrested" upon
return. 8 In addition, the IJ noted both Rodriguez's fear of a
lengthy sentence and the testimony of the witnesses describing the
potential punishment as "harsh, if not fatal."'9
The IJ determined, however, that Rodriguez would not be
punished for his political beliefs, but for committing crimes
against Cuba.5" While the laws were violated in part because of
Rodriguez's political beliefs, this did not mean the "laws [became]
unenforceable as political persecution."5 The IJ concluded that he
could not "take on the burden of assessing criminal penalties in a
foreign country in the guise of political persecution."52 He further
pointed to the United States execution of Private Eddie Slovik for
desertion during World War II as an example of a government's
attitude toward the type of crime committed by Rodriguez. 3
Rodriguez may have violated the law for political reasons but that
did not make the punishment for illegal departure "political
persecution.
54
C. The Board of Immigration Appeals Ruling
Rodriguez appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), but, on December 1, 1994, the BIA
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 421. Private Slovik was an American soldier during World War II
who left his unit and was later convicted of military desertion and sentenced to death.
See WILLIAM BRADFORD HUTE, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK (1954). Hoping to
slow the desertion rate of American troops, General Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the
death warrant and Slovik was executed by firing squad in France on January 31, 1945.
See id.
54 See Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 420.
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affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal." The BIA
adopted the IJ's opinion while independently noting the similarity
between Rodriguez's request for asylum and past cases involving
military desertion." The BIA concluded that "whatever problems
[Rodriguez] may encounter as a result of his illegal departure and
desertion from the merchant marines will be the result of
prosecution for violating the laws of Cuba, and that [those
problems] will not constitute 'persecution.' 57
D. The Ninth Circuit Ruling
On March 20, 1995, Rodriguez filed a petition for review with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 8 The
Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and, after hearing
arguments, vacated the BIA's denial of asylum.59 In an opinion by
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the court found that the principal issue
in determining eligibility for asylum and withholding of
deportation was whether the imminent punishment Rodriguez was
to receive upon return to Cuba constituted "persecution." ' While
the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define
"persecution," the Ninth Circuit found that the BIA was bound
both to follow applicable case law and to consider the principles in
55 See id. at 421.
56 See id.
57 Id.
58 See id. at 420. Initially Rodriguez mistakenly filed a petition with the Eleventh
Circuit where venue was improper. See id. The Eleventh Circuit returned the petition to
Rodriguez and by the time Rodriguez filed the petition with the Ninth Circuit, the
petition was not timely. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1) (1994) (requiring that
petition be filed within ninety days of the BIA's decision). Despite the untimely filing,
the Ninth Circuit addressed the merits of Rodriguez' appeal finding jurisdiction upon the
federal transfer statute. See Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 421-22 (finding that the
purpose of the federal transfer statute is to, inter alia, help those litigants who were
confused about the proper forum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994). Interestingly,
Rodriguez's appeal was brought by two law students from Western State University
College of Law in Fullerton under the supervision of their professor. See Dana Parsons,
They Tried Their Best and Helped a Cuban Refugee Go Free, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996,
at B1. In an unusual gesture, the Ninth Circuit praised the two students for their
"excellence." See Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 416.
59 See id. at 432. The Ninth Circuit instructed that Rodriguez be granted
withholding of deportation and remanded to the Attorney General the issue of
Rodriguez's entitlement to asylum. See id.
60 See id. at 425-26
1045
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status (Handbook).1
The Ninth Circuit, referring to the BIA's decision as "Kafka-
esque,"62 stated that the BIA's interpretation of "persecution,"
namely that Cuba's enforcement of its own laws could not
constitute persecution no matter how severe the penalty, was not
consistent with past case law or with the Handbook.63 The court
noted that "[past] cases stand for the proposition that punishment
for the crime of illegal departure constitutes persecution when the
punishment would be severe." 64 Furthermore, continued the court,
a statute that criminalizes illegal departure imputes to the violator
a political opinion that the state believes it should severely
punish 5
While the BIA was bound by relevant case law, the Ninth
Circuit found that it also should have considered the principles
found in the Handbook.6  Because both the Supreme Court and
circuit courts have followed the Handbook in earlier cases, the
BIA should have looked to the Handbook to "provid[e]
guidance... about 'procedures and criteria for determining
refugee status.' 67  Looking to the section of the Handbook
construing the term "well founded fear of persecution, 68 the court
found that "an alien qualifies as a refugee under the Handbook if
he can demonstrate that he would be subject to severe penalties for
his illegal departure or unauthorized stay abroad and that he left or
61 See id. at 425; OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS, U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4 (1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. For a discussion of
the Handbook, see infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
62 See id. at 420. "Kafkaesque" refers to the twentieth century writer Franz Kafka
and relates to something that is "characterized by surreal distortion and usually a sense
of impending danger." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
980 (3d ed. 1992).
63 See Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 427.
6Id.
65 See id. at 430.
66 See id. at 425.
67 Id. (citing Canas v. Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1990)
(quoting HANDBOOK)).
68 HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 16, para. 61.
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has remained abroad on account of... political opinion."69
Adding to this interpretation of "well founded fear of
prosecution," the court found that earlier cases, along with the
Handbook, apply a more rigorous test.7" In addition to showing
the existence of severe penalties for illegal departure, the alien
must prove that "he is one of the persons at whom the illegal
departure statute was directed-persons who flee their homeland
for political reasons."7 ' The court explained, "[t]hus, severe
punishment is deemed to be persecution only when the petitioner
left his country or remained abroad and would face severe
punishment for illegal departure." 2
Applying the principles found in the earlier cases and the
Handbook, the Ninth Circuit first considered Rodriguez's petition
for withholding of deportation under a "clear probability of
persecution standard., 73 Looking to the IJ's decision, the court
found that Rodriguez left Cuba because of his political opinions
and that he faced a "clear probability" of punishment for the crime
of illegal departure. 4 The court was then left with the question of
whether the punishment Rodriguez would suffer would be
"severe" and thus constitute "political persecution.'7
Emphasizing that Rodriguez faced a prolonged prison sentence
and possibly death, the court had little trouble concluding that
"Rodriguez established a clear probability that he would face
severe punishment for the crime of illegal departure."76 Based on
these findings, the Ninth Circuit granted Rodriguez withholding of
deportation and remanded the determination of Rodriguez'
entitlement to asylum to the Attorney General.77
69 Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 426.
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 430.
73 Id. at 430-31. The court considered the petition under the required standard for
withholding deportation, which is more stringent than the standard for asylum. See id.
If Rodriguez could meet this standard, he would "a fortiori" meet the less stringent
standard for asylum. See id. at 431.
74 See id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 432. The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the BIA's analogy between
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Judge Alex Kozinski," in a concurring opinion, noted the
gravity of judicial review of administrative agencies, stating that
this can, "mean the difference between freedom and oppression
and, quite possibly, life and death."79 Harsh punishment for illegal
departure, wrote Judge Kozinski, was a means of obtaining
government allegiance where it could not be done in more
traditional ways.8° Cuba's placement of restricted emigration
within the realm of its criminal laws could not "camouflage its
atroci[ous] [punishment]" of individuals who wished to live under
a non-Communist government."' Furthermore, the need for
judicial review where inevitable errors occur is magnified when an
individual's life is in jeopardy. 2 Judges Reinhardt and Hawkins,
in a special concurrence, also agreed with the importance of
judicial review in asylum cases. They found judicial review to be
a safeguard to catch the most flagrant of mistakes, drawing a
parallel to the massive turning away of Jewish refugees before and
during World War II, many of whom eventually perished in
Adolph Hitler's concentration camps. 3
III. Background Law
In Rodriguez-Roman, the Ninth Circuit had to determine the
definition of "persecution" based on political opinion as applied to
a Cuban criminal statute prohibiting an individual from departing
the country without governmental permission. The court,
interpreting the Refugee Act of 1980, relied on relevant statutes,
case law, and the Handbook.
illegal departure and military desertion. See id. at 426 n.16. The court found that the
circumstances of this case were different than military desertion and the analysis was
"too appalling to require a response." Id. at 421 n.6. Furthermore, the court found that
application of the rule found in the Handbook for military desertion would be ironic in
light of the BIA's failure to utilize the Handbook regarding illegal departure. See id.;
HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 39-40, paras. 167-71.
78 Judge Kozinski grew up in Communist Romania and came to the United States
in 1962. See Abroad at Home: The Rest is Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1996, at A 15.
79 Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 432 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
80 See id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
81 Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
82 See id. at 433 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
83 See id. (Reinhardt, J., & Hawkins, J., specially concurring).
1048 [Vol. 22
1997] ASYLUM FOR FEARING ILLEGAL DEPARTURE LAWS
A. The Refugee Act of 1980
In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980,84 which
amended the existing Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 5
The Refugee Act was implemented to conform the United States
refugee law with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees86 which had been acceded to by the United
States in 1968.87 The Refugee Act offers two routes for an alien
facing deportation: asylum and withholding of deportation."
The United States Attorney General may grant asylum under
section 208(a) of the Refugee Act89 only if she determines that
such alien is a "refugee" within the meaning of section
1101(a)(42)(A). 9° For purposes of section 1101(a)(42)(A), a
"refugee" is a person who cannot return to his or her country
"because of persecution or a well founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion.... 9  After the "refugee" status
is initially determined, however, the granting of asylum is purely
discretionary for the Attorney General. 92
The second form of relief for an alien is withholding of
deportation. 93 Under section 243(h) of the Refugee Act, the
84 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-24 (1980).
85 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
86 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
87 See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). The Protocol bound parties to the
provisions of articles two through thirty-four of the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (July 28, 1951). See id. at 416. Thus, the
Refugee Act incorporates the terms of the Convention although the United States is not a
signatory member to the Convention. See id. at 416 n.9.
88 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1253(h) (1994).
89 The asylum section provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such
alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101 (a)(42)(A) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
90 See id.
91 Id. § 1 101(a)(42)(A).
92 See id. § 1158(a).
93 See id. § 1253(h).
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Attorney General is required to withhold deportation of an alien if
the alien can show that his or her "life or freedom would be
threatened... on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
9 4
Thus, unlike the process for asylum, which gives the Attorney
General discretion, withholding deportation is mandatory upon the
required showing.
The respective burdens of proof that an alien must show for
withholding of deportation and asylum differ. In INS v. Stevic,95
the Supreme Court, interpreted the "would be threatened"
language of section 243(h) to mean that an alien requesting
withholding of deportation must establish a "clear probability of
persecution."" The Court failed to go any deeper into the "clear
probability" standard other than noting that the evidence must
show "that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject
to persecution." 97 Furthermore, the Stevic Court left open the issue
of the burden of proof required for asylum and its "well founded
fear" language.98 Three years later, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,99
the Supreme Court addressed the issue avoided by the Stevic
Court. The Supreme Court determined that the "clear probability
of persecution" standard found in withholding of deportation
proceedings did not govern section 208(a) asylum requests and the
"well-founded fear" language contained therein.'0° Instead, an
alien seeking to show a "well-founded fear of persecution" need
only show that the persecution is a "reasonable possibility."' ' The
Court acknowledged the ambiguity of the term "well-founded
fear," but did not further refine the test.' °2 The only way to give
such a term a "concrete meaning," the Court explained, was
94 Id.
95 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
96 Id. at 430.
97 Id. at 429-30.
98 See id. at 430.
99 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
100 See id. at 434-36.
101 Id. at 440 (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1984)).
102 See id. at 448.
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"through a process of case-by-case adjudication."'' 3 Thus, other
than distinguishing the two standards found in section 208(a) and
243(h), no definition of a "well founded fear" was given and
courts were urged to respect agency decisions when faced with the
issue.' 04
B. United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status
The United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status"0 5 was published in 1979 by the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It was
intended to provide guidance to governments about "procedures
and criteria for determining refugee status."'0 6 For instance, the
Handbook interprets the phrase "well founded fear of persecution"
and states the circumstances where punishment for unlawful
departure constitutes such "persecution."'0 7
In particular, the section interpreting "well-founded fear of
persecution" states:
[t]he legislation of certain States imposes severe penalties on
nationals who depart from the country in an unlawful manner or
remain abroad without authorization. Where there is a reason to
believe that a person, due to his illegal departure ... is liable to
such severe penalties, his recognition as a refugee will be
justified if it can be shown that his motives for
leaving... [involve political opinion]. 0 8
To qualify as "political persecution," the alien must show that
she has opinions different from the government and that she fears
persecution for having those opinions.' 9  According to the
Handbook, prosecution by a government can be, in some
circumstances, a pretext for persecution based on political
103 Id.
104 See id.
105 HANDBOOK, supra note 61.
106 Id. at 1.
107 See id. at 16, para. 61; see also Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 426 (9th
Cir. 1996).
108 HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 16, para. 61.
109 See id. at 19, para. 80.
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opinion."' If the prosecution is a result of a politically motivated
act and the punishment is in accordance with the general laws of a
country, however, such prosecution will not necessarily be
political persecution."' Therefore, punishment for illegal
departure is not per se political persecution, but it can constitute
such persecution under the right circumstances.
Although the Handbook is not binding on the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
have looked to it for guidance. "2 In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS,"3
the Supreme Court was faced with, among other things, defining
the term "refugee."' 1 4 To aid its interpretation, the Court noted that
they "[were] guided by the analysis set forth in the [Handbook].""5
The Handbook was found to provide direction in interpreting the
United Nations Protocol, with which Congress sought to conform
when drafting the Refugee Act."6 The Handbook "has been
widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that
the Protocol establishes."'1 7
C. Case Law
1. Political Persecution or Criminal Penalties
An alien seeking asylum and withholding of deportation must
show that his potential persecution would be based on the alien's
"race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."'' 8 It is also well established that
individual nations have a "sovereign right" to enforce their own
110 See id. at 20, paras. 84, 85.
III See Gregory S. Porter, Persecution Based on Political Opinion: Interpretation
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 260 (1992).
112 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57
F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1995).
113 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
114 See id. at438.
115 Id. at 439. "We do not suggest, of course, that the explanation in the U.N.
Handbook has the force of law or in any way binds the INS with reference to the asylum
provision of § 208(a)." Id. at 439 n.22.
116 See id. at 439 n.22.
117 Id.
118 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
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laws.119 For instance, "[c]riminal prosecution for illegal departure
is generally not considered to be persecution. '12 This general rule
has exceptions, however, such as where the prosecution results in
severe punishment. 2' In this situation, despite the generally
applied criminal statute, the persecutor is viewed as having
"imputed a political opinion" to those leaving its borders.
In the 1969 case of Kovac v. INS,'22 the petitioner defected
from Yugoslavia and sought asylum in the United States.'23 Kovac
insisted that if returned to Yugoslavia he would be imprisoned
because his departure would be considered "open defiance and
denunciation of Communism."'24 The Ninth Circuit overturned the
BIA's denial of asylum finding that although Congress did not
intend to provide refuge for "common criminals," it did intend to
grant asylum for "those who would, if returned, be punished
criminally for violating a politically motivated prohibition against
defection from a police state."'25
The Kovac court, determining that punishment for illegal
departure can constitute "political persecution," relied on a
previous BIA decision, Matter of Janus & Janek.126 In Janus, two
Czechoslovakian citizens who were members of the Communist
Party entered the United States as nonimmigrants for pleasure.'27
After overextending their authorized stays, the two
Czechoslovakians applied for withholding of deportation status
under section 243(h) claiming that they would be subjected to
119 See Cynthia Isaacs, Note, The Torch Dims: The Ambiguity of Asylum and the
"Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" Standard in Sandeghi v. INS, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 721, at 730-31; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 431(1), (3) (1992).
120 Li v. INS, 92 F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1996).
121 See id.; see also Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that prosecution of one who is guilty of criminal acts can constitute "persecution
on the basis of political opinion if the punishment is excessive or arbitrary").
122 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
123 See id.
124 Id. at 104.
125 Id.
126 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
127 See id. at 867. Despite their past membership in the Communist Party, the two
eventually denounced the government and its Communist form. See id. at 870-71.
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political persecution if returned.2 ' A conviction by
Czechoslovakia had already been entered against them in absentia
under its Article 109 of the Criminal Law entitled "Defection from
the Republic."'29 Article 109 covered "(1) a person who leaves
Czechoslovakia without permission, (2) a Czechoslovak citizen
who remains in a foreign country without permission, and (3) one
who organizes either of those acts or leads a group or groups of
people across the border, they being without permits to leave the
country.
' 130
The BIA admitted that not every alien who is punished for
violating a travel restriction has experienced "political
persecution.' 3' A person who leaves a country with no political
motivation or who fails to return for a reason unrelated to politics
"is not entitled to a section 243(h) stay solely on the basis that he
may face criminal prosecution for overstay. '12  Conversely,
statutes criminalizing departure can serve political purposes. 33
Whether an illegal departure law will be characterized as political
depends upon "the provisions of the particular statute and the
manner in which it is administered., 13 4  An alien who has not
expressed opposition to the government prior to his illegal flight
may be allowed relief if he can show that his departure was
politically motivated and the punishment he faces upon return is
similarly political.
35
Both the Ninth Circuit and the BIA have, in some
circumstances, failed to recognize an alien's claim of political
128 See id. at 869.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 869-70. The applicants were found in violation of the second category and
classified as defectors from the republic. See id. One of the aliens was to be imprisoned
for one year and had most of his property confiscated; the other faced an eight-month
sentence. See id.. The two claimed that, in addition to the sentences, they could expect
harsher punishment on their return. See id. at 870-71.
131 See id. at 876.
132 Id. For example, an alien who finds his economic situation in the United States
advantageous and does not want to return to his country would not be able to claim
"political persecution" on the basis of an impending criminal penalty for leaving his
country. See id.
133 See id. at 873.
134 Id.
135 See id at 876.
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persecution where the prosecution was not found to be severe. In
Li v. INS,'36 for instance, the petitioner escaped from China to the
United States seeking asylum.13 The petitioner claimed that he
would be tortured and detained because his departure would be
equated with an anti-China political opinion.' The "severe
punishment" assertion was rebutted, however, causing the court to
doubt that the petitioner would be subject to the year in prison
provided in the criminal code.' Furthermore, although the Li
court initially recognized the theory of "imputed political
opinion,"'4' it distinguished that theory from the petitioner's
situation.14 ' To the court, no political opinion was being imputed
to the petitioner because, inter alia, it appeared that the petitioner
could expect the same punishment that awaited other emigrants.' 42
2. Imputed Political Opinion
To gain asylum, a petitioner must prove he holds a political
opinion. 43 An asylum seeker can establish his political opinion on
the basis of his own affirmative opinion,'" his political
neutrality, 145 or a political opinion attributed to him by his
persecutors, otherwise known as an imputed political opinion."'
In Rodriguez-Roman, the court applied the imputed political
opinion doctrine to Rodriguez's situation, 14 while also requiring
136 92 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1996).
137 See id. at 987-88.
138 See id. at 988.
139 See id.
140 For a discussion of "imputed political opinion," see infra notes 149-71 and
accompanying text.
141 See Li, 92 F.3d at 988.
142 See id. The court stated that, "[t]o accept Petitioner's argument on this point
would effectively open our borders to unlimited immigration." Id.
143 See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997).
I" See id. at 1488. Affirmative political beliefs have been established by past
activities or by testimony. See id.
145 See id. Political neutrality occurs in an environment in which holding a neutral
opinion is hazardous. See id. It may be established by pronouncements, actions, and
may include the absence of a political opinion. See id.
146 See id.
147 See Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416,430 (9th Cir. 1996).
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him to show his affirmative opinion.4'
The theory that severe prosecution can amount to political
persecution rests on the doctrine of imputed political opinion. "
This doctrine allows a finding of a well-founded fear of
persecution even when an alien "holds no opinion, or holds an
opinion different than that attributed to him or her" if "the
persecutor believes that the alien holds such an opinion and
persecutes the alien for that reason.""'5 Among the circuit courts,
the "imputed political opinion" doctrine has been utilized most
often by the Ninth Circuit. 5'
An imputed political opinion is not limited to illegal departure
statutes and can be found in a number of contexts.' Moreover, to
establish an imputed political opinion, it is generally the
persecutor's views that are relevant, not the views of the victim.'53
Addressing cases that did not involve punishment for illegal
departure, the Ninth Circuit has been willing to find "political
persecution," despite a lack of political motivation by the asylum
seeker. 54 In Aguilera-Cota v. INS, "' the applicant for asylum did
not express a "'political' opinion in the typical fashion [but] fit[]
within the statutory definition of that term under the doctrine of
imputed political opinion."'56 To grant the requested relief, the
court had to find an imputed political opinion because the alien
expressed none.'57 Likewise, in Lazo-Majano v. INS,5' the Ninth
148 See Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1488.
149 See Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 430.
150 Porter, supra note 111, at 248; see Bill Coffman, Organization Membership and
Political Opinion as Groundsfor Refugee Status, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 465, 484 (1996).
151 See Sachin D. Adarkar, Political Asylum and Political Freedom: Moving
Towards a Just Definition of "Persecution on Account of Political Opinion" Under the
Refugee Act, 42 UCLA L. REv. 181, 190 & n.50 ("A district court within the Seventh
Circuit is the only other court to have explicitly upheld an asylum claim under the
doctrine of imputed political opinion.").
152 See id.
153 See Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1488.
154 See infra notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
155 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
156 Id. at 1379. The government threats faced by the petitioner were based on his
employment and because of his perceived adherence to the government's cause. See id.
The BIA and the IJ refused to recognize the theory of imputed political opinion. See id.
157 See id.; see also Coffman, supra note 150, at 485; Porter, supra note 111, at 248
n.126.
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Circuit noted in dicta that "even if [the applicant] had no political
opinion and was innocent of a single reflection on the government
of her country, the cynical imputation of political opinion to her is
what counts... .159
Where an applicant has requested asylum on the basis of
punishment for illegal departure, however, it is generally held that
the person must have fled her homeland for political reasons.'
Thus, the victim's view is relevant if she is relying on the fact that
she will be severely punished for leaving the country. 6' The BIA
and the Ninth Circuit have allowed varying degrees of protestation
to suffice for this type of asylum claim, though. In some
situations, merely holding conflicting views, without expressing
these views, has been enough to gain asylum, while other
authorities have denied relief because of a lack of political
expression. 6 2 Regardless of the required level of political
expression, the validity of the imputed political opinion in such
situations remained.
In 1992, however, the Supreme Court decided INS v. Elias-
Zacarias,63 which seems to undermine the theory of imputed
political opinion. Elias-Zacarias was a native Guatemalan, who
guerrillas had attempted forcibly to conscript into fighting for their
cause.' 64 Fearing government retaliation, Elias-Zacarias refused to
join the guerrilla group and fled to the United States, where he
sought political asylum. 65 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
found that political persecution is "persecution on account of the
158 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Fisher v. INS, 79
F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
159 Id. at 1435.
160 See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 104 (9th Cir. 1969); Matter of Janus & Janek,
12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968); Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 359 (1983).
161 See Kovac, 407 F.2d at 104; Janus, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 876.
162 Compare Janus, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 874 (finding that because the applicant had
never expressed an adverse political opinion the government could have no political
motivation to punish him), with Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 359 (1983)
(granting relief even though the applicant was a member of the Communist party and
had never publicly denounced Communism). The Ninth Circuit cases, prior to
Rodriguez-Roman, have addressed facts where the petitioner had some political
expression. See, e.g., Kovac, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
163 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
'64 See id. at 479.
165 See id. at 480.
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victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's."' 66 The Court held
that to gain political asylum the applicant must show that he has a
firmly held political opinion and that he would be persecuted
because of that opinion. 167 While this brought the imputed political
opinion doctrine into question, the Court implied that doctrine's
vitality holding that there was no "indication (assuming, arguendo,
it would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias-
Zacarias' refusal was politically based."'
168
Following Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Circuit answered any
lingering questions about whether the imputed political opinion
doctrine was valid. In Canas-Segovia v. INS,169 the court
confirmed that "imputed political opinion [was] still a valid basis
for relief."' 70 To fit within the requirements of Elias-Zacarias, the
Ninth Circuit found that by definition, the imputed opinion
includes elements of motive. "' Under the Refugee Act, the
persecutor's imputed view becomes the applicant's required
political opinion.'
D. Standard of Review of the Board of Immigration's
Decision
A determination by the BIA that an alien is not eligible for
asylum must be upheld if "supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."'7 A
court may reverse a decision to grant asylum only if the evidence
was such that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
required fear of persecution did not exist. 4 To reverse the BIA
finding, it is not enough that the evidence supports the reversal;
the evidence must "compel[] it."' 75  Even though the BIA's
166 Id. at 482.
167 See id.
168 Id.
169 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992).
170 Id. at 601.
171 See id. at 602.
172 See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997).
173 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1994); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992).
174 See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84.
175 Id. at481 n.1.
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interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act are
reviewed de novo, such interpretations are given substantial
deference.
76
Where the Congressional intent from the statute is clear, the
BIA and the reviewing court must give effect to* this definite
congressional meaning.' 7  If the Congressional intent is
ambiguous, however, the court may only question whether the
agency's determination is "based on a permissible construction of
the statute." '178 The INA does not define the term "persecution";
therefore, the courts must defer to the BIA's determination unless
it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
''179
In interpreting the INA, however, the Ninth Circuit has found that
the BIA is bound by evaluations in earlier case law.8 Thus, while
the BIA's individual determination is given great weight, it must
be consistent with prior decisions. 8'
IV. Significance of the Case
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Rodriguez-Roman is important
for two reasons. First, the court's decision requires asylum
seekers to fulfill an additional test,8 2 beyond proving severe
punishment, and then makes this test close to meaningless by
allowing it to be easily satisfied. Second, Rodriguez-Roman
demonstrates the Ninth Circuit's desire to review BIA denials of
asylum despite case law urging it to show deference to the BIA' 83
The overriding proposition of Rodriguez-Roman appears to be
that, "punishment for the crime of illegal departure constitutes
persecution when the punishment would be severe."'84  The
176 See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (199) (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
177 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
178 Id. at 843.
179 Fisher, 79 F.3d at 961 (quoting Romero v. INS, 39 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.
1994)).
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 427 (9th Cir. 1996).
183 Id. at 432-33 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
184 Id. at 430.
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Rodriguez-Roman court added a more rigorous test to its finding-
the alien must have fled his homeland for political reasons.'85 Prior
to Rodriguez-Roman, the Ninth Circuit was willing to find
political persecution based on the imputed political opinion
doctrine where the alien had no political opinion.8 6 Following
Canas-Segovia, the imputed political opinion doctrine remained
valid, but whether or not an alien relying on the doctrine had to
show his own political motivation for leaving the country
remained vague.'87 Because the Ninth Circuit in Canas-Segovia
found that the imputed political opinion doctrine automatically
included elements of motive,' it would have been conceivable for
the Rodriguez-Roman court to do away with the Kovac
requirements that the applicant have a political motivation for
leaving his native country.'89 Such a rule would have allowed
Cuban immigrants to gain asylum in the United States even if they
left for reasons wholly nonpolitical-e.g., fear of combat, desire to
be with one's family, or desire to obtain a better economic
situation. Essentially, this would have opened the borders to all
Cubans as long as they could prove the punishment they would
face upon return would be severe, which had already been
determined in Rodriguez-Roman.
The Rodriguez-Roman court instead cited Kovac, applying the
added test that the alien must have had a political motivation for
leaving his country. 9 ' This additional test seemingly eliminates
aliens who claim to leave their countries for nonpolitical reasons.
In light of the court's reference to abuses overseas and emphasis
on "treating the refugees with sensitivity, compassion, and
care[,]"'' the more rigorous test seems, on its face, somewhat
surprising.
To the contrary, the Rodriguez-Roman decision can act as a
manual on successfully gaining political asylum from Cuba. In
185 See id.
186 See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 163-71 accompanying text.
188 See Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992).
189 See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 104 (9th Cir. 1969).
190 See Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 427 (9th Cir. 1996).
191 Id. at 433 (Reinhardt, J., & Hawkins, J., specially concurring).
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finding that Rodriguez was politically motivated in leaving Cuba,
the Ninth Circuit, relying on the IJ's decision, found it convincing
that Rodriguez "harbored life-long anti-Communist sympathies."' '
Future Cuban emigrants, even if leaving for nonpolitical reasons,
may obtain political asylum by declaring their similar hatred of the
Communist system because, under Rodriguez-Roman, the
prosecution the emigrant faces upon return has already been
declared "severe."'1 93 The type of political expression required by
the courts will, therefore, become a key issue.
In Kovac, the petitioner affirmatively refused to perform the
requests of Yugoslavian secret police. 94 The BIA in Janus,
however, granted the petitioner relief even though he was a
member of the Communist Party and he made "no claim that he
ever publicly denounced the [Communist] Party, although he was
always opposed to Communism." '195 The petitioner claimed to
have been a member of the Communist Party out of necessity and
to protect his family.1 96 In Sibrun, the BIA felt that the alien's
failure to publicly denounce the government signified that the
government could have no motivation to punish him and,
therefore, denied him relief'97 Of these views, the Rodriguez-
Roman court sided with the BIA in Janus and allowed Rodriguez
to prove his political motivation for leaving by simply giving
testimony that he detests the government.'98 Thus, Cuban
immigrants in the Ninth Circuit will now be able to prove their
political motivation for leaving Cuba with less effort-i.e., by
merely stating they abhor Cuba's government.
Rodriguez-Roman also signified the Ninth Circuit's declaration
of its intent to judicially review immigration cases. 99 Without this
192 Id. at 420.
193 See id. at431.
194 See Kovac, 407 F.2d at 104. Kovac was asked to mingle among Hungarian
refugees and inform the police of the refugees' activities. See id.
195 Matter of Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 874 (1968).
196 See id.
197 See Matter of Sibrun, 18 1. &N. Dec. 354, 358 (1983).
198 See generally Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996).
199 See id. at 432-33 (Kozinski, J., concurring). "[A]gencies are run by people and
people make mistakes. Review by a tribunal outside the agency helps correct these rare
but tragic errors .... [T]he effort is surely worth the candle." Id. at 433 (Kozinski, J.,
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added review, the court believed that "grave injustices" could take
place and, although courts are subject to error, it acts as a "safety
mechanism" that can catch administrative errors.2 °0 According to
the case law, however, review should be confined to
interpretations that are "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary
to the statute." ''
To be sure, the BIA and the Ninth Circuit agreed that
Rodriguez would be subject to a lengthy prison sentence or
possibly even death upon his return to Cuba, and that the BIA did
not utilize the imputed political opinion doctrine.2 2 Within this
setting, the court's review of the BIA's denial of asylum looks
more like a compassionate correction than reviewing an egregious
error. Consider, however, that the Ninth Circuit viewed much
milder sentences as "severe penalties," and future courts, utilizing
this, may view Rodriguez as a license to overturn any BIA
determinations on the basis that the punishment is severe. For
instance, the State Department reported that Rodriguez would be
subject to a three-year sentence, not the twenty-year sentence
urged by the defense.2 3 Even accepting this contention, the court
found this penalty sufficiently severe to constitute persecution.
204
Indeed, relying on Janus, the court noted that even a one-year
sentence for illegal departure constituted "severe punishment.,
205
Just how minor a sentence the Ninth Circuit is willing to accept as
"severe punishment" is not clear. A line must exist below which
the length of punishment is not considered severe; a "brief
confinement for illegal departure, although 'repugnant to [the
United States] concept of justice,' would not fall within the ambit
of persecution.""2 6 Still, the term "brief confinement" is difficult to
ascertain and is subject to a court's interpretation.2 7 Therefore, a
concurring).
200 See id. (Reinhardt, J., & Hawkins, J., specially concurring).
201 Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Romero v. INS, 39
F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1994)).
202 See Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 431.
203 See id. at 428.
204 See id.
205 Id.
206 Id. (quoting Sovich v. INS, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963)).
207 Persons who had illegally left China were subject to a brief initial detention and
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court may review BIA determinations that do not utilize case law
finding an alien subject to "severe penalties" despite a relatively
minor sentence.
Reading Rodriguez-Roman as allowing easy entrance to all
Cubans could cause increased tension between, on one hand,
administrative agencies and conservative politicians and, on the
other, the federal judiciary.2"8 Conservative politicians speak out
against what they consider an "illegal immigration crisis" that
causes overpopulation in schools, stress on welfare programs, and
a soaring crime rate.20 9 In this setting, judicial review that grants
asylum is considered overreaching, an abuse of authority, and
"interpretive sinning."210 The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez-Roman,
however, accented the "importance of treating the problem of
political and religious refugees with sensitivity, compassion, and
care." '' Government agencies sometimes do not remain the most
objective because of "reasons ranging from partisan or political
concerns ....212
In any event, the Ninth Circuit's ability to review future BIA
holdings such as Rodriguez-Roman may be finished. On
September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed The Illegal
Immigration Reform Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) 3 According to the new law, a decision by the BIA
denying asylum should not be disturbed unless it is "manifestly
contrary to law," and an "abuse of discretion., 21 4 Under such a
standard, it is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit would have heard
Rodriguez's appeal. 5 One commentator noted that, "[t]he concept
a fine, but this was not considered "severe." See Li v. INS, 92 F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir.
1996).
208 See Bruce Fein, Sinned Against More Than Sinning, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1996, at A15.
209 See Congressional Press Releases, Act of 1996, Sept. 24, 1996 (statement by
Rep. Lamar Smith).
210 See Fein, supra note 207, at A15.
211 Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 433.
212 Id.
213 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
214 See Gary E. Endelman, Congress Tightens Its Controls, N.J.L.J., Dec. 2, 1996,
at 32.
215 See Henry Weinstein, Court Grants Asylum to Cuban Refugee, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1996, at A3.
19971 1063
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
of discretionary review has been shaken to its very core... [with]
the creation of a new legal universe." '16 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's
emphasis on the importance of judicial review may have been an
indirect challenge to the passage of the IIRIRA.
V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Rodriguez that an alien who
faces "severe punishment" for violating an illegal departure statute
may very well have saved a man's life. 7 Depending on the
weight given to Rodriguez-Roman, it also may have allowed for
any and all Cubans to find refuge in the United States, assuming
they oppose the Communist system of Cuba."' The Ninth Circuit
attempted to apply a "more rigorous" test by requiring that an alien
seeking asylum based on a country's severe punishment for illegal
departure prove he left the country for political reasons." 9 In
essence, this added test becomes insignificant if achieved by the
simple testimony of the asylum seeker. Under this test, as long as
the alien knows what to say-that she abhors the Cuban
government--she should gain asylum.
A resulting immigration influx would, according to some,
result in a number of social ills to the United States and its
citizens.2 Moreover, such a continued exodus would be contrary
to the intent of the Clinton administration's agreement with
Cuba."' Regardless of the side taken, the ability of courts to
review BIA decisions like that of Rodriguez-Roman and provide
relief have been greatly curtailed with the passage of the IIRIRA.
Given the deference now accorded to the BIA, it will be interesting
to see how the BIA interprets Rodriguez-Roman and the U.S.-
Cuban agreement. Meanwhile, the lives of illegal aliens seeking
refuge in the United States hang in the balance.
ANDREW BONAVIA
216 Endelman, supra note 213, at 32.
217 See Parsons, supra note 58, at B1.
218 See supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
219 See Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 430 (9th Cir. 1996).
220 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
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